The CSB issues safety recommendations to prevent the recurrence or reduce the likelihood or consequences of similar incidents or hazards in the future. Recommendations are issued to a variety of parties, including government entities, safety organizations, trade unions, trade associations, corporations, emergency response organizations, educational institutions, and public interest groups. Recommendations are published in CSB reports and are closed only by vote of the Board. The CSB tracks all recommendations and communicates regularly with recommendations recipients to ensure that the recommended corrective actions are implemented. For more information, see Frequently Asked Questions about CSB recommendations.
2016-04-I-FL-5
Provide effective warning about nitrous oxide decomposition hazards Modify nitrous oxide pump product literature to include warnings about nitrous oxide decomposition hazards, illustrated by examples from historical incidents, and refer users to this CSB investigation report for additional information. Status: Closed - Acceptable Action
Provide effective warning about nitrous oxide decomposition hazards
Modify nitrous oxide pump product literature to include warnings about nitrous oxide decomposition hazards, illustrated by examples from historical incidents, and refer users to this CSB investigation report for additional information.
2016-04-I-FL-1
The goal of 2016-04-I-FL-R1 is to prevent all nitrous oxide explosions at its facilities, while preventing harm to workers and the public. Following the August 28, 2016, incident, the company began a comprehensive initiative to review its nitrous oxide production facilities, trucking fleet, and cylinder-filling operations. The scope of the ongoing Air Liquide initiative is shown in Table 1. Complete the development and implementation of the company’s nitrous oxide business process safety initiative as shown in Table 1, consistent with the findings, conclusions, and recommendations contained in this report. Status: Closed - Exceeds Recommended Action
The goal of 2016-04-I-FL-R1 is to prevent all nitrous oxide explosions at its facilities, while preventing harm to workers and the public.
Following the August 28, 2016, incident, the company began a comprehensive initiative to review its nitrous oxide production facilities, trucking fleet, and cylinder-filling operations. The scope of the ongoing Air Liquide initiative is shown in Table 1.
Complete the development and implementation of the company’s nitrous oxide business process safety initiative as shown in Table 1, consistent with the findings, conclusions, and recommendations contained in this report.
2016-04-I-FL-2
Safety Management System for Nitrous Oxide Manufacturing Develop and implement a safety management system standard for nitrous oxide manufacturing, to manage known process safety hazards, including nitrous oxide decomposition, which includes appropriate elements based on chemical industry good practice guidance, such as CCPS Guidelines for Risk Based Process Safety, Essential Practices for Managing Chemical Reactivity Hazards, and Guidelines for Implementing Process Safety Management. Status: Closed - Exceeds Recommended Action
Safety Management System for Nitrous Oxide Manufacturing
Develop and implement a safety management system standard for nitrous oxide manufacturing, to manage known process safety hazards, including nitrous oxide decomposition, which includes appropriate elements based on chemical industry good practice guidance, such as CCPS Guidelines for Risk Based Process Safety, Essential Practices for Managing Chemical Reactivity Hazards, and Guidelines for Implementing Process Safety Management.
2016-04-I-FL-3
Ensure Effective Flame Arrestor Design Modify Compressed Gas Association (CGA) standard CGA G-8.3, Safe Practices for Storage and Handling of Nitrous Oxide to require testing of safety devices, such as strainers used as flame arrestors, for applications where a safety device is used to quench a nitrous oxide decomposition reaction. To ensure that these safety devices meet the intended purpose, the user should test the safety device by simulating conditions of use. In addition, require users to document the required performance standard or test protocol followed. Status: Closed - Acceptable Alternative Action
Ensure Effective Flame Arrestor Design
Modify Compressed Gas Association (CGA) standard CGA G-8.3, Safe Practices for Storage and Handling of Nitrous Oxide to require testing of safety devices, such as strainers used as flame arrestors, for applications where a safety device is used to quench a nitrous oxide decomposition reaction. To ensure that these safety devices meet the intended purpose, the user should test the safety device by simulating conditions of use. In addition, require users to document the required performance standard or test protocol followed.
2016-04-I-FL-4
Require Pump Run-Dry Safety Interlocks Apply ISA-84 Modify Compressed Gas Association (CGA) standard CGA G-8.3, Safe Practices for Storage and Handling of Nitrous Oxide to reference and require applying International Society of Automation (ISA) standard ISA-84, Functional Safety: Safety Instrumented Systems for the Process Industry Sector to safety interlocks such as the nitrous oxide pump “run-dry” shutdown. Status: Closed - Acceptable Action
Require Pump Run-Dry Safety Interlocks Apply ISA-84
Modify Compressed Gas Association (CGA) standard CGA G-8.3, Safe Practices for Storage and Handling of Nitrous Oxide to reference and require applying International Society of Automation (ISA) standard ISA-84, Functional Safety: Safety Instrumented Systems for the Process Industry Sector to safety interlocks such as the nitrous oxide pump “run-dry” shutdown.
2016-04-I-FL-6
2011-3-I-WV-1
For all new and existing equipment and operations at AL Solutions facilities that process combustible dusts or powders, apply the following chapters of NFPA 484-2012, Standard for Combustible Metals: Chapter 12, Titanium Chapter 13, Zirconium Chapter 15, Fire Prevention, Fire Protection, and Emergency Response Chapter 16, Combustible Metal Recycling Facilities Status: Closed - Unacceptable Action/No Response Received
For all new and existing equipment and operations at AL Solutions facilities that process combustible dusts or powders, apply the following chapters of NFPA 484-2012, Standard for Combustible Metals:
2011-3-I-WV-2
Develop training materials that address combustible dust hazards and plant-specific metal dust hazards and then train all employees and contractors. Require periodic (e.g., annual) refresher training for all employees and contractors. Status: Closed - Unacceptable Action/No Response Received
Develop training materials that address combustible dust hazards and plant-specific metal dust hazards and then train all employees and contractors. Require periodic (e.g., annual) refresher training for all employees and contractors.
2011-3-I-WV-3
Prohibit the use of sprinkler systems and water deluge systems in all buildings that process or store combustible metals. Status: Closed - Unacceptable Action/No Response Received
Prohibit the use of sprinkler systems and water deluge systems in all buildings that process or store combustible metals.
2011-3-I-WV-4
Conduct a process hazard analysis as defined in NFPA 484-2012, Section 12.2.5, and submit a copy to the local fire department or the enforcing authority for the fire code. Status: Closed - Unacceptable Action/No Response Received
Conduct a process hazard analysis as defined in NFPA 484-2012, Section 12.2.5, and submit a copy to the local fire department or the enforcing authority for the fire code.
2009-3-I-VA-1 URGENT!
Take immediate action to reduce the risk of a catastrophic failure of Tanks 202, 205, and 209 at the Allied Terminals Hill Street facility including but not limited to significantly reducing the maximum liquid levels ("safe fill height") based on sound engineering principles. Report the actions taken to the City of Chesapeake. Status: Closed - No Longer Applicable
Take immediate action to reduce the risk of a catastrophic failure of Tanks 202, 205, and 209 at the Allied Terminals Hill Street facility including but not limited to significantly reducing the maximum liquid levels ("safe fill height") based on sound engineering principles. Report the actions taken to the City of Chesapeake.
2009-3-I-VA-2 URGENT!
Select and retain a qualified, independent tank engineering firm to evaluate Tanks 202, 205, and 209 and determine their fitness for continued service. The evaluation should be based on recognized and generally accepted good engineering practices, such as API 653 - Tank Inspection, Repair Alteration, and Reconstruction and API 579 - Fitness for Service. Status: Closed - No Longer Applicable
Select and retain a qualified, independent tank engineering firm to evaluate Tanks 202, 205, and 209 and determine their fitness for continued service. The evaluation should be based on recognized and generally accepted good engineering practices, such as API 653 - Tank Inspection, Repair Alteration, and Reconstruction and API 579 - Fitness for Service.
2009-3-I-VA-3 URGENT!
Within 30 days, provide the report prepared by the independent tank engineering firm to the City of Chesapeake, together with a comprehensive action plan and schedule to address any identified deficiencies. Status: Closed - No Longer Applicable
Within 30 days, provide the report prepared by the independent tank engineering firm to the City of Chesapeake, together with a comprehensive action plan and schedule to address any identified deficiencies.
2009-3-I-VA-6
Hire a qualified independent reviewer to verify that maximum liquid levels for all tanks at Allied’s Norfolk and Chesapeake terminals meet the requirements of American Petroleum Institute Standard 653, Tank Inspection, Repair, Alteration, and Reconstruction. At a minimum, the review should verify that all requirements for welding, inspection of welds, and In-Service and Out-of-Service tank inspections are met. Make the complete review report for both terminals available to the Cities of Norfolk, Chesapeake, and Portsmouth, Virginia, as well as the Virginia Department of Environmental Quality. Status: Closed - Acceptable Action
Hire a qualified independent reviewer to verify that maximum liquid levels for all tanks at Allied’s Norfolk and Chesapeake terminals meet the requirements of American Petroleum Institute Standard 653, Tank Inspection, Repair, Alteration, and Reconstruction. At a minimum, the review should verify that all requirements for welding, inspection of welds, and In-Service and Out-of-Service tank inspections are met. Make the complete review report for both terminals available to the Cities of Norfolk, Chesapeake, and Portsmouth, Virginia, as well as the Virginia Department of Environmental Quality.
2009-3-I-VA-7
Develop and implement worker safety procedures for initial filling of tanks following major modification or change-in-service. At a minimum, require the exclusion of all personnel from secondary containment during the initial filling. Status: Closed - Acceptable Action
Develop and implement worker safety procedures for initial filling of tanks following major modification or change-in-service. At a minimum, require the exclusion of all personnel from secondary containment during the initial filling.
2009-3-I-VA-4
Revise and reissue the Chemical Emergency Preparedness and Prevention Office Rupture Hazard from Liquid Storage Tanks Chemical Safety Alert. At a minimum, revise the alert to: 1) Include the Allied Terminals tank failure, 2) Discuss the increased rupture hazard during first fill or hydrostatic testing, and 3) List The Fertilizer Institute fertilizer tank inspection guidelines in the reference section. Status: Closed - Acceptable Action
Revise and reissue the Chemical Emergency Preparedness and Prevention Office Rupture Hazard from Liquid Storage Tanks Chemical Safety Alert. At a minimum, revise the alert to: 1) Include the Allied Terminals tank failure, 2) Discuss the increased rupture hazard during first fill or hydrostatic testing, and 3) List The Fertilizer Institute fertilizer tank inspection guidelines in the reference section.
2009-3-I-VA-10
Formally recommend to all member companies the incorporation of The Fertilizer Institute tank inspection guidelines into contracts for the storage of liquid fertilizer at terminals. Status: Closed - Acceptable Action
Formally recommend to all member companies the incorporation of The Fertilizer Institute tank inspection guidelines into contracts for the storage of liquid fertilizer at terminals.
2009-3-I-VA-5
Require state regulation of 100,000-gallon and larger fertilizer storage tanks (which presently are located solely along and in the area of the Elizabeth River) or authorize local jurisdictions to regulate these tanks. The regulations should: 1) Address design, construction, maintenance, and inspection of 100,000-gallon and larger liquid fertilizer storage tanks, and 2) Incorporate generally recognized and accepted good engineering practice. Status: Closed - Acceptable Action
Require state regulation of 100,000-gallon and larger fertilizer storage tanks (which presently are located solely along and in the area of the Elizabeth River) or authorize local jurisdictions to regulate these tanks. The regulations should: 1) Address design, construction, maintenance, and inspection of 100,000-gallon and larger liquid fertilizer storage tanks, and 2) Incorporate generally recognized and accepted good engineering practice.
2009-3-I-VA-8
Implement The Fertilizer Institute’s inspection guidelines as part of tank inspector training and inspection procedures for fertilizer tank inspection. Status: Closed - Acceptable Action
Implement The Fertilizer Institute’s inspection guidelines as part of tank inspector training and inspection procedures for fertilizer tank inspection.
2009-3-I-VA-9
Revise company procedures to require tank inspectors to verify that radiography required as part of the calculation for a maximum liquid level has been performed. Status: Closed - Acceptable Action
Revise company procedures to require tank inspectors to verify that radiography required as part of the calculation for a maximum liquid level has been performed.
2017-08-I-TX-1
Reduce flood risk to as low as reasonably practicable (ALARP). Ensure that any safeguards for flooding meet independent layer of protection requirements. Status: Closed - Acceptable Action
Reduce flood risk to as low as reasonably practicable (ALARP). Ensure that any safeguards for flooding meet independent layer of protection requirements.
2017-08-I-TX-2
Within 18 months, develop a policy requiring that Arkema and its subsidiaries that manufacture organic peroxides or that have processes which involve more than the threshold quantities of highly hazardous chemicals (HHC) periodically (corresponding with PHA cycle), analyze such facilities to determine whether they are at risk for extreme weather events such as hurricanes or floods. Status: Closed - Acceptable Action
Within 18 months, develop a policy requiring that Arkema and its subsidiaries that manufacture organic peroxides or that have processes which involve more than the threshold quantities of highly hazardous chemicals (HHC) periodically (corresponding with PHA cycle), analyze such facilities to determine whether they are at risk for extreme weather events such as hurricanes or floods.
2017-08-I-TX-3
Establish corporate requirements for its facilities that manufacture organic peroxides or that have processes which involve more than the threshold quantities of highly hazardous chemicals (HHC) to ensure that critical safeguards, such as backup power, function as intended during extreme weather events, including hurricanes or floods. Status: Closed - Acceptable Action
Establish corporate requirements for its facilities that manufacture organic peroxides or that have processes which involve more than the threshold quantities of highly hazardous chemicals (HHC) to ensure that critical safeguards, such as backup power, function as intended during extreme weather events, including hurricanes or floods.
2017-08-I-TX-4
Develop broad and comprehensive guidance to help companies assess their U.S. facility risk from all types of potential extreme weather events. Guidance should address the issues identified in this report and cover actions required to prepare for extreme weather, resiliency and protection of physical infrastructure and personnel during extreme weather, as well as recovery operations following an extreme weather event, where appropriate. Include guidance for each of the following: • Addressing common mode failures of critical safeguards or equipment that could be caused by extreme weather events, including but not limited to flooding. For flooding scenarios, sufficient independent layers of protection should be available if floodwater heights reach the facility. • Evaluating facility susceptibility to potential extreme weather events. Relevant safety information such as flood maps should be incorporated as process safety information. • Involving relevant professional disciplines, including engineering disciplines, to help ensure risk assessments and process hazard analyses are as robust as practicable for any given facility. Status: Closed - Acceptable Action
Develop broad and comprehensive guidance to help companies assess their U.S. facility risk from all types of potential extreme weather events. Guidance should address the issues identified in this report and cover actions required to prepare for extreme weather, resiliency and protection of physical infrastructure and personnel during extreme weather, as well as recovery operations following an extreme weather event, where appropriate. Include guidance for each of the following:
• Addressing common mode failures of critical safeguards or equipment that could be caused by extreme weather events, including but not limited to flooding. For flooding scenarios, sufficient independent layers of protection should be available if floodwater heights reach the facility.
• Evaluating facility susceptibility to potential extreme weather events. Relevant safety information such as flood maps should be incorporated as process safety information.
• Involving relevant professional disciplines, including engineering disciplines, to help ensure risk assessments and process hazard analyses are as robust as practicable for any given facility.
2017-08-I-TX-5
Update your emergency operations training using lessons learned from the Arkema incident to help ensure that personnel enforcing evacuation perimeters are not harmed by exposure to hazardous chemical releases. Update existing protocols and revise training curricula to include the use of analytical tools, air monitoring, and personal protective equipment, to provide appropriate protection when emergency equipment or personnel need to be moved through an evacuation zone during a hazardous materials release. Include a process for periodic refresher training. Status: Closed - Acceptable Action
Update your emergency operations training using lessons learned from the Arkema incident to help ensure that personnel enforcing evacuation perimeters are not harmed by exposure to hazardous chemical releases. Update existing protocols and revise training curricula to include the use of analytical tools, air monitoring, and personal protective equipment, to provide appropriate protection when emergency equipment or personnel need to be moved through an evacuation zone during a hazardous materials release. Include a process for periodic refresher training.
2007-6-I-KS-4
Recommend to your membership companies that prepare MSDSs to update the MSDSs to: -Identify and include a warning for materials that are static accumulators and that may form ignitable vapor-air mixtures in storage tanks. -Include a statement that bonding and grounding may be insufficient to eliminate the hazard from static-accumulating flammable liquids, and provide examples of additional precautions and references to the relevant consensus guidance (e.g., NFPA 77, Recommended Practice on Static Electricity (2007), and API Recommended Practice 2003, Protection Against Ignitions Arising Out of Static, Lightning, and Stray Currents (2008)). -Include conductivity testing data for the materials that are static accumulators and that may form ignitable vapor-air mixtures in storage tanks. Status: Closed - Acceptable Action
Recommend to your membership companies that prepare MSDSs to update the MSDSs to: -Identify and include a warning for materials that are static accumulators and that may form ignitable vapor-air mixtures in storage tanks. -Include a statement that bonding and grounding may be insufficient to eliminate the hazard from static-accumulating flammable liquids, and provide examples of additional precautions and references to the relevant consensus guidance (e.g., NFPA 77, Recommended Practice on Static Electricity (2007), and API Recommended Practice 2003, Protection Against Ignitions Arising Out of Static, Lightning, and Stray Currents (2008)). -Include conductivity testing data for the materials that are static accumulators and that may form ignitable vapor-air mixtures in storage tanks.
2007-6-I-KS-3
Revise ANSI Z400.1 to advise chemical manufacturers and importers that prepare MSDSs to: -Identify and include a warning for materials that are static-accumulators and that may form ignitable vapor-air mixtures in storage tanks; -Advise users that bonding and grounding may be insufficient to eliminate the hazard from static-accumulating flammable liquids, and provide examples of additional precautions and references to the relevant consensus guidance (e.g., NFPA 77, Recommended Practice on Static Electricity (2007), and API Recommended Practice 2003, Protection Against Ignitions Arising Out of Static, Lightning, and Stray Currents (2008)); and -Provide conductivity testing data for materials that are static accumulators and that may form ignitable vapor-air mixtures in storage tanks. Status: Closed - Acceptable Action
Revise ANSI Z400.1 to advise chemical manufacturers and importers that prepare MSDSs to: -Identify and include a warning for materials that are static-accumulators and that may form ignitable vapor-air mixtures in storage tanks; -Advise users that bonding and grounding may be insufficient to eliminate the hazard from static-accumulating flammable liquids, and provide examples of additional precautions and references to the relevant consensus guidance (e.g., NFPA 77, Recommended Practice on Static Electricity (2007), and API Recommended Practice 2003, Protection Against Ignitions Arising Out of Static, Lightning, and Stray Currents (2008)); and -Provide conductivity testing data for materials that are static accumulators and that may form ignitable vapor-air mixtures in storage tanks.
2007-6-I-KS-5
2007-6-I-KS-6
2007-6-I-KS-7
2007-6-I-KS-8
2007-6-I-KS-1
Revise the "Guidance for Hazard Determination for compliance with the OSHA Hazard Communication Standard" to advise chemical manufacturers and importers that prepare MSDSs to: -Evaluate flammable liquids to determine their potential to accumulate static electricity and form ignitable vapor-air mixtures in storage tanks. -Test the conductivity of the flammable liquid and include the testing results in the MSDS. Status: Open - Acceptable Response or Alternate Response
Revise the "Guidance for Hazard Determination for compliance with the OSHA Hazard Communication Standard" to advise chemical manufacturers and importers that prepare MSDSs to: -Evaluate flammable liquids to determine their potential to accumulate static electricity and form ignitable vapor-air mixtures in storage tanks. -Test the conductivity of the flammable liquid and include the testing results in the MSDS.
2007-6-I-KS-2
Prior to the next revision, communicate to the Sub-Committee on the Globally Harmonized System of Classification and Labeling of Chemicals (SCEGHS) the need to amend the GHS to advise chemical manufacturers and importers that prepare MSDSs to: -Identify and include a warning for materials that are static accumulators and that may form ignitable vapor-air mixtures in storage tanks. -Advise users that bonding and grounding may be insufficient to eliminate the hazard from static-accumulating flammable liquids, and provide examples of additional precautions and references to the relevant consensus guidance (e.g., NFPA 77, Recommended Practice on Static Electricity (2007), and API Recommended Practice 2003, Protection Against Ignitions Arising Out of Static, Lightning, and Stray Currents (2008)). -Provide conductivity testing data for materials that are static accumulators and that may form ignitable vapor-air mixtures in storage tanks. Status: Closed - Acceptable Action
Prior to the next revision, communicate to the Sub-Committee on the Globally Harmonized System of Classification and Labeling of Chemicals (SCEGHS) the need to amend the GHS to advise chemical manufacturers and importers that prepare MSDSs to: -Identify and include a warning for materials that are static accumulators and that may form ignitable vapor-air mixtures in storage tanks. -Advise users that bonding and grounding may be insufficient to eliminate the hazard from static-accumulating flammable liquids, and provide examples of additional precautions and references to the relevant consensus guidance (e.g., NFPA 77, Recommended Practice on Static Electricity (2007), and API Recommended Practice 2003, Protection Against Ignitions Arising Out of Static, Lightning, and Stray Currents (2008)). -Provide conductivity testing data for materials that are static accumulators and that may form ignitable vapor-air mixtures in storage tanks.
2007-6-I-KS-9
2008-08-I-WV-2
Review and revise, as necessary, all Bayer production unit standard operating procedures to ensure they address all operating modes (startup, normal operation, temporary operations, emergency shutdown, emergency operations, normal shutdown, and startup following a turnaround or emergency shutdown), are accurate, and approved. Status: Closed - Acceptable Action
Review and revise, as necessary, all Bayer production unit standard operating procedures to ensure they address all operating modes (startup, normal operation, temporary operations, emergency shutdown, emergency operations, normal shutdown, and startup following a turnaround or emergency shutdown), are accurate, and approved.
2008-08-I-WV-3
Ensure that all facility fire brigade members are trained in the National Incident Management System, consistent with municipal and state emergency response agencies. Status: Closed - Acceptable Action
Ensure that all facility fire brigade members are trained in the National Incident Management System, consistent with municipal and state emergency response agencies.
2008-08-I-WV-4
Evaluate the fenceline air monitor program against federal, state, and local regulations, and Bayer corporate policies, and upgrade and install air monitoring devices as necessary to ensure effective monitoring of potential releases of high-hazard chemicals at the perimeter of the facility. Status: Closed - Acceptable Action
Evaluate the fenceline air monitor program against federal, state, and local regulations, and Bayer corporate policies, and upgrade and install air monitoring devices as necessary to ensure effective monitoring of potential releases of high-hazard chemicals at the perimeter of the facility.
2008-08-I-WV-5
Commission an independent human factors and ergonomics study of all Institute site PSM/RMP covered process control rooms to evaluate the human-control system interface, operator fatigue, and control system familiarity and training. Develop and implement a plan to resolve all recommendations identified in the study that includes assigned responsibilities, required corrective actions, and completion dates. Status: Closed - Acceptable Action
Commission an independent human factors and ergonomics study of all Institute site PSM/RMP covered process control rooms to evaluate the human-control system interface, operator fatigue, and control system familiarity and training. Develop and implement a plan to resolve all recommendations identified in the study that includes assigned responsibilities, required corrective actions, and completion dates.
2008-08-I-WV-1
Revise the corporate PHA policies and procedures to require: a. Validation of all PHA assumptions to ensure that risk analysis of each PHA scenario specifically examines the risk(s) of intentional bypassing or other nullifications of safeguards, b. Addressing all phases of operation and special topics including those cited in chapter 9 of "Guidelines for Hazard Evaluation Procedures" (CCPS, 2008), and c. Training all PHA facilitators on the revised policies and procedures prior to assigning the facilitator to a PHA team. Ensure all PHAs are updated to conform to the revised procedures. Status: Closed - Acceptable Action
Revise the corporate PHA policies and procedures to require: a. Validation of all PHA assumptions to ensure that risk analysis of each PHA scenario specifically examines the risk(s) of intentional bypassing or other nullifications of safeguards, b. Addressing all phases of operation and special topics including those cited in chapter 9 of "Guidelines for Hazard Evaluation Procedures" (CCPS, 2008), and c. Training all PHA facilitators on the revised policies and procedures prior to assigning the facilitator to a PHA team. Ensure all PHAs are updated to conform to the revised procedures.
2008-08-I-WV-12
In light of the findings of this report and the serious potential hazards to workers and the public from chemicals used and stored at the Bayer Institute site (such as phosgene, MIC, and methomyl), conduct a comprehensive Risk Management Program (RMP) inspection of the complex. Coordinate with the Occupational Safety and Health Administration, as appropriate. Status: Closed - No Longer Applicable
In light of the findings of this report and the serious potential hazards to workers and the public from chemicals used and stored at the Bayer Institute site (such as phosgene, MIC, and methomyl), conduct a comprehensive Risk Management Program (RMP) inspection of the complex. Coordinate with the Occupational Safety and Health Administration, as appropriate.
2008-08-I-WV-6
Establish a Hazardous Chemical Release Prevention Program to enhance the prevention of accidental releases of highly hazardous chemicals, and optimize responses in the event of their occurrence. In establishing the program, study and evaluate the possible applicability of the experience of similar programs in the country, such as those summarized in Section 5.3 of this report. As a minimum: a. Ensure that the new program: 1. Implements an effective system of independent oversight and other services to enhance the prevention of accidental releases of highly hazardous chemicals 2. Facilitates the collaboration of multiple stakeholders in achieving common goals of chemical safety; and, 3. Increases the confidence of the community, the workforce, and the local authorities in the ability of the facility owners to prevent and respond to accidental releases of highly hazardous chemicals. b. Define the characteristics of chemical facilities that would be covered by the new Program, such as the hazards and potential risks of their chemicals and processes, their quantities, and similar relevant factors; c. Ensure that covered facilities develop, implement, and submit for review and approval: 1. Applicable hazard and process information and evaluations. 2. Written safety plans with appropriate descriptions of hazard controls, safety culture and human factors programs with employee participation, and consideration of the adoption of inherently safer systems to reduce risks 3. Emergency response plans; and, 4. Performance indicators addressing the prevention of incidents and chemical incidents. d. Ensure that the program has the right to evaluate the documents submitted by the covered facilities, and to require modifications, as necessary e. Ensure that the program has right-of-entry to covered facilities, and access to requisite information to conduct periodic audits of safety systems and investigations of chemical releases; f. Establish a system of fees assessed on covered facilities sufficient to cover the oversight and related services to be provided to the facilities including necessary technical and administrative personnel; and, g. Consistent with applicable law, ensure that the program provides reasonable public participation with the program staff in review of facility programs and access to: 1. The materials submitted by covered facilities (e.g., hazard evaluations, safety plans, emergency response plans); 2. The reviews conducted by program staff and the modifications triggered by those reviews; 3. Records of audits and incident investigations conducted by the program; 4. Performance indicator reports and data submitted by the facilities, and; 5. Other relevant information concerning the hazards and the control methods overseen by the program. h. Ensure that the program will require a periodic review of the designated agency activities and issue a periodic public report of its activities and recommended action items Status: Closed - Unacceptable Action/No Response Received
Establish a Hazardous Chemical Release Prevention Program to enhance the prevention of accidental releases of highly hazardous chemicals, and optimize responses in the event of their occurrence. In establishing the program, study and evaluate the possible applicability of the experience of similar programs in the country, such as those summarized in Section 5.3 of this report. As a minimum: a. Ensure that the new program: 1. Implements an effective system of independent oversight and other services to enhance the prevention of accidental releases of highly hazardous chemicals 2. Facilitates the collaboration of multiple stakeholders in achieving common goals of chemical safety; and, 3. Increases the confidence of the community, the workforce, and the local authorities in the ability of the facility owners to prevent and respond to accidental releases of highly hazardous chemicals. b. Define the characteristics of chemical facilities that would be covered by the new Program, such as the hazards and potential risks of their chemicals and processes, their quantities, and similar relevant factors; c. Ensure that covered facilities develop, implement, and submit for review and approval: 1. Applicable hazard and process information and evaluations. 2. Written safety plans with appropriate descriptions of hazard controls, safety culture and human factors programs with employee participation, and consideration of the adoption of inherently safer systems to reduce risks 3. Emergency response plans; and, 4. Performance indicators addressing the prevention of incidents and chemical incidents. d. Ensure that the program has the right to evaluate the documents submitted by the covered facilities, and to require modifications, as necessary e. Ensure that the program has right-of-entry to covered facilities, and access to requisite information to conduct periodic audits of safety systems and investigations of chemical releases; f. Establish a system of fees assessed on covered facilities sufficient to cover the oversight and related services to be provided to the facilities including necessary technical and administrative personnel; and, g. Consistent with applicable law, ensure that the program provides reasonable public participation with the program staff in review of facility programs and access to: 1. The materials submitted by covered facilities (e.g., hazard evaluations, safety plans, emergency response plans); 2. The reviews conducted by program staff and the modifications triggered by those reviews; 3. Records of audits and incident investigations conducted by the program; 4. Performance indicator reports and data submitted by the facilities, and; 5. Other relevant information concerning the hazards and the control methods overseen by the program. h. Ensure that the program will require a periodic review of the designated agency activities and issue a periodic public report of its activities and recommended action items
2008-08-I-WV-8
Work with the Kanawha and Putnam counties Emergency Response Directors to prepare and issue a revision to the Kanawha Putnam County Emergency Response Plan and Annexes to address facility emergency response and Incident Command when such functions are provided by the facility owner. Status: Closed - Acceptable Action
Work with the Kanawha and Putnam counties Emergency Response Directors to prepare and issue a revision to the Kanawha Putnam County Emergency Response Plan and Annexes to address facility emergency response and Incident Command when such functions are provided by the facility owner.
2008-08-I-WV-10
In light of the findings of this report and the serious potential hazards to workers and the public from chemicals used and stored at the Bayer Institute site (such as phosgene, MIC, and methomyl), conduct a comprehensive Process Safety Management (PSM) inspection of the complex. Coordinate with the Environmental Protection Agency, as appropriate. Status: Closed - No Longer Applicable
In light of the findings of this report and the serious potential hazards to workers and the public from chemicals used and stored at the Bayer Institute site (such as phosgene, MIC, and methomyl), conduct a comprehensive Process Safety Management (PSM) inspection of the complex. Coordinate with the Environmental Protection Agency, as appropriate.
2008-08-I-WV-11
Revise the Chemical National Emphasis Program and the targeting criteria to: a. Expand the coverage to all OSHA regions, b. Include in the targeting criteria from which potential inspections are selected all establishments that have submitted certifications of completions of actions in response to previous PSM citations; c. Require NEP inspections to examine the status of compliance of all previously cited PSM program items for which the company has submitted certifications of completion to OSHA. Status: Closed - Acceptable Action
Revise the Chemical National Emphasis Program and the targeting criteria to: a. Expand the coverage to all OSHA regions, b. Include in the targeting criteria from which potential inspections are selected all establishments that have submitted certifications of completions of actions in response to previous PSM citations; c. Require NEP inspections to examine the status of compliance of all previously cited PSM program items for which the company has submitted certifications of completion to OSHA.
2008-08-I-WV-7
Work with the Director of the Kanawha-Charleston Health Department to ensure the successful planning, fee collection, and implementation of the Hazardous Chemical Release Prevention Program as described in Recommendation 2008-08-WV-R6, above, including the provision of services to all eligible facilities in the State. Status: Closed - No Longer Applicable
Work with the Director of the Kanawha-Charleston Health Department to ensure the successful planning, fee collection, and implementation of the Hazardous Chemical Release Prevention Program as described in Recommendation 2008-08-WV-R6, above, including the provision of services to all eligible facilities in the State.
2008-08-I-WV-9
Revise the Fire Department Evaluation Administrative Section Matrix addressing the periodic inspection of local fire departments to include a requirement for inspectors to examine and identify the status of National Incident Management System fire department personnel training. Status: Closed - Acceptable Action
Revise the Fire Department Evaluation Administrative Section Matrix addressing the periodic inspection of local fire departments to include a requirement for inspectors to examine and identify the status of National Incident Management System fire department personnel training.