The CSB issues safety recommendations to prevent the recurrence or reduce the likelihood or consequences of similar incidents or hazards in the future. Recommendations are issued to a variety of parties, including government entities, safety organizations, trade unions, trade associations, corporations, emergency response organizations, educational institutions, and public interest groups. Recommendations are published in CSB reports and are closed only by vote of the Board. The CSB tracks all recommendations and communicates regularly with recommendations recipients to ensure that the recommended corrective actions are implemented.

For more information, see Frequently Asked Questions about CSB recommendations.


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Recommendations

Motiva Enterprises Sulfuric Acid Tank Explosion (1 Recommendations)
Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) (1 Recommendations)
Open: 0% | Closed: 100%

Final Report Released On: August 28, 2002

2001-05-I-DE-1

(Superseded by 2019-01-I-TX-R7 from the Intercontinental Terminals Company (ITC) report)

Ensure coverage under the Process Safety Management Standard (29 CFR 1910.119) of atmospheric storage tanks that could be involved in a potential catastrophic release as a result of being interconnected to a covered process with 10,000 pounds of a flammable substance.


Status: Closed - Reconsidered/Superseded
Closed - Reconsidered/Superseded (C - R/S) - Recipient rejects the recommendation and also supports the rejection with a rationale with which the Board concurs. This designation may apply when later facts indicate that the concerns expressed in the recommendation were actually addressed prior to the incident, or when a recommendation is superseded by a new, more appropriate recommendation.
 

PDF Document Recommendation Status Change Summary

Optima Belle Explosion and Fire (3 Recommendations)
Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) (3 Recommendations)
Open: 100% | Closed: 0%

Final Report Released On: July 06, 2023

2021-02-I-WV-11

Update the Chemical Reactivity Hazards website (https://www.osha.gov/chemical-reactivity) to include various reactivity assessment tools developed since the 2002 Index-Based Method for Assessing Exothermic Runaway Risk and the 2004 Preliminary Screening Method. Mathematical methods, thermal analysis methods (e.g., Accelerating Rate Calorimeter (ARC) testing), ASTM E1231-19 Standard Practice for Calculation of Hazard Potential Figures of Merit for Thermally Unstable Materials, Stoessel Criticality, and the O.R.E.O.S. Method (an assessment that combines Oxygen balance calculations, the Rule of 6, and the Explosive functional group list with Onset decomposition and scale) are tools that could be considered for the update. The “Additional Resources” section of the website should also be evaluated for necessary changes and updates.


Status: Open - Awaiting Response or Evaluation/Approval of Response
Open - Awaiting Response or Evaluation/Approval of Response (O - ARE/AR) - The recipient has not submitted a substantive response, or the evaluation by CSB staff of a response is pending, or the Board has not yet acted on staff recommendation of status.
 

PDF Document Recommendation Status Change Summary

2021-02-I-WV-12

Following the implementation of CSB recommendation 2021-02-I-WV-R11, ensure that the chemical industry is aware of the Chemical Reactivity Hazards website (https://www.osha.gov/chemical-reactivity) by developing and implementing a comprehensive outreach plan that actively targets the chemical industry and related trade associations. The outreach plan may include such means as a national news release and OSHA’s “QuickTakes” newsletter and/or Safety and Health Information Bulletins. This outreach plan should be coordinated with OSHA’s On-Site Consultation Program partners.


Status: Open - Awaiting Response or Evaluation/Approval of Response
Open - Awaiting Response or Evaluation/Approval of Response (O - ARE/AR) - The recipient has not submitted a substantive response, or the evaluation by CSB staff of a response is pending, or the Board has not yet acted on staff recommendation of status.
 

PDF Document Recommendation Status Change Summary

2021-02-I-WV-13

Amend the Process Safety Management (PSM) Standard, 29 CFR 1910.119, to achieve more comprehensive control of reactive hazards that could have catastrophic consequences.

  • Broaden the application to cover reactive hazards resulting from process-specific conditions and combinations of chemicals. Additionally, broaden coverage of hazards from self-reactive chemicals. In expanding PSM coverage, use objective criteria. Consider criteria such as the North American Industry Classification System (NAICS), a reactive hazard classification system (e.g., based on heat of reaction or hazardous gas evolution), incident history, or catastrophic potential.
  • In the compilation of process safety information, require that multiple sources of information be sufficiently consulted to understand and control potential reactive hazards. Useful sources include but are not limited to:

- Literature surveys (e.g., Bretherick’s Handbook of Reactive Chemical Hazards, Sax’s Dangerous Properties of Industrial Materials, CAS SciFinder).

- Information developed from computerized tools (e.g., ASTM’s CHETAH, CCPS’s Chemical Reactivity Worksheet).

- Chemical property data compiled in PubChem and the REACH (Registration, Evaluation, and Authorization of Chemicals) dossiers maintained by the European Chemicals Agency (ECHA).

- Chemical reactivity test data produced by employers or obtained from other sources following established standards such as:

- ASTM E537-20, Standard Test Method for Chemicals by Differential Scanning Calorimetry;

- ASTM E1981-22, Standard Guide for Assessing Thermal Stability of Materials by Methods of Accelerating Rate Calorimetry;

- ASTM E2550-21, Standard Test Method for Thermal Stability by Thermogravity; and

- ASTM E1231-19, Standard Practice for Calculation of Hazard Potential Figures of Merit for Thermally Unstable Materials.

- Relevant incident data from the plant, the corporation, industry, and government.

  • Augment the process hazard analysis (PHA) element to explicitly require an evaluation of reactive hazards. In revising this element, evaluate the need to consider relevant factors, such as:

- Rate and quantity of heat or gas generated.

- Maximum operating temperature to avoid a runaway reaction from decomposition.

- Time to Maximum Rate under Adiabatic Conditions (TMRad).

- Thermal stability of reactants, reaction mixtures, byproducts, waste streams, and products.

- Effect of variables such as charging rates, catalyst addition, and possible contaminants.

- Understanding the consequences of runaway reactions or hazardous gas evolution.

(Superseded 2001-01-H-XX-R1)


Status: Open - Awaiting Response or Evaluation/Approval of Response
Open - Awaiting Response or Evaluation/Approval of Response (O - ARE/AR) - The recipient has not submitted a substantive response, or the evaluation by CSB staff of a response is pending, or the Board has not yet acted on staff recommendation of status.
 

PDF Document Recommendation Status Change Summary

Partridge Raleigh Oilfield Explosion and Fire (1 Recommendations)
Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) (1 Recommendations)
Open: 0% | Closed: 100%

Final Report Released On: June 12, 2007

2006-7-I-MS-4

Implement a Local Emphasis Program (LEP) to inspect companies in the oil and gas production and extraction sector.


Status: Closed - Acceptable Alternative Action
Closed - Acceptable Alternative Action (C - AAA)
 

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Pryor Trust Fatal Gas Well Blowout and Fire (1 Recommendations)
Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) (1 Recommendations)
Open: 0% | Closed: 100%

Final Report Released On: June 12, 2019

2018-01-I-OK-1

Implement one of the three following options regarding regulatory changes:

(a) OPTION 1: Apply the Process Safety Management (PSM) standard (29 CFR 1910.119) to the drilling of oil and gas wells; or

(b) OPTION 2: Apply the Process Safety Management (PSM) standard (29 CFR 1910.119) to the drilling of oil and gas wells as in OPTION 1, and make the necessary modifications to customize it to oil and gas drilling operations; or

(c) OPTION 3: Develop a new standard with a safety management system framework similar to PSM that applies only to the drilling of onshore oil and gas wells that includes but is not limited to the following:

  1. Detailed written operating procedures with specified steps and equipment alignment for all operations;

  2. Written procedures for the management of changes (except replacements in kind) in procedures, the well plan, and equipment;

  3. A risk assessment of hazards associated with the drilling plan;

  4. A requirement to follow Recognized and Generally Accepted Good Engineering Practices (RAGAGEP);

  5. Development of a Well Construction Interface Document between the operator and the drilling contractor prior to the commencement of drilling activities which at a minimum includes a bridging document and well plan specifying barriers and how to manage them;

  6. The performance and documentation of flow checks using acceptable methods at defined points during the operation for a specified duration; and

  7. A requirement for employee participation, similar to the Employee Participation requirement in the OSHA PSM standard.


Status: Closed - Reconsidered/Superseded
Closed - Reconsidered/Superseded (C - R/S) - Recipient rejects the recommendation and also supports the rejection with a rationale with which the Board concurs. This designation may apply when later facts indicate that the concerns expressed in the recommendation were actually addressed prior to the incident, or when a recommendation is superseded by a new, more appropriate recommendation.
 

PDF Document Recommendation Status Change Summary

Texas Tech University Chemistry Lab Explosion (1 Recommendations)
Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) (1 Recommendations)
Open: 0% | Closed: 100%

Final Report Released On: October 19, 2011

2011-5-CS-TX-1

Broadly and explicitly communicate to the target audience of research laboratories the findings and recommendations of the CSB Texas Tech report focusing on the message that while the intent of 29 CFR 1910.1450 (Occupational Exposure to Hazardous Chemicals in Laboratories Standard) is to comprehensively address health hazards of chemicals, organizations also need to effectively implement programs and procedures to control physical hazards of chemicals (as defined in 1910.1450(b)). At a minimum:

a.     Develop a Safety and Health Information Bulletin (SHIB) pertaining to the need to control physical hazards of chemicals; and
b.     Disseminate the SHIB (and any related products) on the OSHA Safety and Health Topics website pertaining to Laboratories (http://www.osha.gov/SLTC/laboratories/index.html)

 


Status: Closed - Acceptable Action
Closed - Acceptable Action (C - AA) - The recipient has completed action on the recommendation. The action taken meets the objectives envisioned by the Board.
 

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Union Carbide Corp. Nitrogen Asphyxiation Incident (1 Recommendations)
Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) (1 Recommendations)
Open: 0% | Closed: 100%

Final Report Released On: February 23, 1999

1998-05-I-LA-4

Issue a safety alert that addresses the hazards and provides safety guidelines for the use of temporary enclosures that are erected around equipment containing hazardous substances.


Status: Closed - Acceptable Action
Closed - Acceptable Action (C - AA) - The recipient has completed action on the recommendation. The action taken meets the objectives envisioned by the Board.
 

Universal Form Clamp Co. Explosion and Fire (2 Recommendations)
Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) (2 Recommendations)
Open: 0% | Closed: 100%

Final Report Released On: April 10, 2007

2006-8-I-IL-1

Amend 1910.106 Flammable and Combustible Liquids to require facilities that handle flammable and combustible liquids to implement the requirements of 1910.38 Emergency Action Plans.


Status: Closed - Reconsidered/Superseded
Closed - Reconsidered/Superseded (C - R/S) - Recipient rejects the recommendation and also supports the rejection with a rationale with which the Board concurs. This designation may apply when later facts indicate that the concerns expressed in the recommendation were actually addressed prior to the incident, or when a recommendation is superseded by a new, more appropriate recommendation.
 

PDF Document Recommendations Status Change Summary

2006-8-I-IL-2

Amend 1910.38 Emergency Action Plans to require employers to conduct practice evacuation drills at least annually, but more frequently if necessary to ensure employees are prepared for emergencies.


Status: Closed - Reconsidered/Superseded
Closed - Reconsidered/Superseded (C - R/S) - Recipient rejects the recommendation and also supports the rejection with a rationale with which the Board concurs. This designation may apply when later facts indicate that the concerns expressed in the recommendation were actually addressed prior to the incident, or when a recommendation is superseded by a new, more appropriate recommendation.
 

PDF Document Recommendations Status Change Summary