The CSB issues safety recommendations to prevent the recurrence or reduce the likelihood or consequences of similar incidents or hazards in the future. Recommendations are issued to a variety of parties, including government entities, safety organizations, trade unions, trade associations, corporations, emergency response organizations, educational institutions, and public interest groups. Recommendations are published in CSB reports and are closed only by vote of the Board. The CSB tracks all recommendations and communicates regularly with recommendations recipients to ensure that the recommended corrective actions are implemented. For more information, see Frequently Asked Questions about CSB recommendations.
2011-4-I-TN-1
(Superseded by 2017-07-I-WI-R10 from the Didion Milling Co. investigation) Ensure that the forthcoming OSHA Combustible Dust Standard includes coverage for combustible metal dusts including iron and steel powders. Status: Closed - Reconsidered/Superseded
(Superseded by 2017-07-I-WI-R10 from the Didion Milling Co. investigation)
Ensure that the forthcoming OSHA Combustible Dust Standard includes coverage for combustible metal dusts including iron and steel powders.
2011-4-I-TN-2
(Superseded by 2017-07-I-WI-R10 from the Didion Milling Co. investigation) Develop and publish a proposed combustible dust standard for general industry within one year of the approval of this case study. Status: Closed - Reconsidered/Superseded
Develop and publish a proposed combustible dust standard for general industry within one year of the approval of this case study.
2011-4-I-TN-3
Revise the Combustible Dust National Emphasis Program (NEP) to add industry codes for facilities that generate metal dusts (e.g., North American Industrial Classification System, NAICS, code 331111 Iron and Steel Mills, and other applicable codes not currently listed). Send notification letters to all facilities nationwide under these codes to inform them of the hazards of combustible metal dusts and NEP coverage. Status: Closed - Acceptable Alternative Action
Revise the Combustible Dust National Emphasis Program (NEP) to add industry codes for facilities that generate metal dusts (e.g., North American Industrial Classification System, NAICS, code 331111 Iron and Steel Mills, and other applicable codes not currently listed). Send notification letters to all facilities nationwide under these codes to inform them of the hazards of combustible metal dusts and NEP coverage.
2008-05-I-GA-11
(Superseded by 2017-07-I-WI-R10 from the Didion Milling Co. investigation) Proceed expeditiously, consistent with the Chemical Safety Board’s November 2006 recommendation and OSHA’s announced intention to conduct rulemaking, to promulgate a comprehensive standard to reduce or eliminate hazards from fire and explosion from combustible powders and dust. Status: Closed - Reconsidered/Superseded
Proceed expeditiously, consistent with the Chemical Safety Board’s November 2006 recommendation and OSHA’s announced intention to conduct rulemaking, to promulgate a comprehensive standard to reduce or eliminate hazards from fire and explosion from combustible powders and dust.
2001-01-H-1
(Superseded by 2021-02-I-WV-R13 from the Optima Belle report) Amend the Process Safety Management Standard (PSM), 29 CFR 1910.119, to achieve more comprehensive control of reactive hazards that could have catastrophic consequences. Broaden the application to cover reactive hazards resulting from process-specific conditions and combinations of chemicals. Additionally, broaden coverage of hazards from self-reactive chemicals. In expanding PSM coverage, use objective criteria. Consider criteria such as the North American Industry Classification System (NAICS), a reactive hazard classification system (e.g., based on heat of reaction or toxic gas evolution), incident history, or catastrophic potential. In the compilation of process safety information, require that multiple sources of information be sufficiently consulted to understand and control potential reactive hazards. Useful sources include: - Literature surveys (e.g., Bretherick's Handbook of Reactive Chemical Hazards, Sax's Dangerous Properties of Industrial Materials). - Information developed from computerized tools (e.g., ASTM's CHETAH, NOAA's The Chemical Reactivity Worksheet). - Chemical reactivity test data produced by employers or obtained from other sources (e.g., differential scanning calorimetry, thermogravimetric analysis, accelerating rate calorimetry). - Relevant incident reports from the plant, the corporation, industry, and government. - Chemical Abstracts Service. Augment the process hazard analysis (PHA) element to explicitly require an evaluation of reactive hazards. In revising this element, evaluate the need to consider relevant factors, such as: - Rate and quantity of heat or gas generated. - Maximum operating temperature to avoid decomposition. - Thermal stability of reactants, reaction mixtures, byproducts, waste streams, and products. - Effect of variables such as charging rates, catalyst addition, and possible contaminants. - Understanding the consequences of runaway reactions or toxic gas evolution. Status: Closed - Reconsidered/Superseded
(Superseded by 2021-02-I-WV-R13 from the Optima Belle report)
Amend the Process Safety Management Standard (PSM), 29 CFR 1910.119, to achieve more comprehensive control of reactive hazards that could have catastrophic consequences.
- Literature surveys (e.g., Bretherick's Handbook of Reactive Chemical Hazards, Sax's Dangerous Properties of Industrial Materials).
- Information developed from computerized tools (e.g., ASTM's CHETAH, NOAA's The Chemical Reactivity Worksheet).
- Chemical reactivity test data produced by employers or obtained from other sources (e.g., differential scanning calorimetry, thermogravimetric analysis, accelerating rate calorimetry).
- Relevant incident reports from the plant, the corporation, industry, and government.
- Chemical Abstracts Service.
- Rate and quantity of heat or gas generated.
- Maximum operating temperature to avoid decomposition.
- Thermal stability of reactants, reaction mixtures, byproducts, waste streams, and products.
- Effect of variables such as charging rates, catalyst addition, and possible contaminants.
- Understanding the consequences of runaway reactions or toxic gas evolution.
2001-01-H-2
Implement a program to define and record information on reactive incidents that OSHA investigates or requires to be investigated under OSHA regulations. Structure the collected information so that it can be used to measure progress in the prevention of reactive incidents that give rise to catastrophic releases. Status: Closed - Acceptable Action
Implement a program to define and record information on reactive incidents that OSHA investigates or requires to be investigated under OSHA regulations. Structure the collected information so that it can be used to measure progress in the prevention of reactive incidents that give rise to catastrophic releases.
2019-01-I-TX-7
Eliminate the atmospheric storage tank exemption from the PSM standard. (Superseded 2001-05-I-DE-R1 from the Motiva report and 2010-02-I-PR-R4 from the Caribbean Petroleum (CAPECO) report) Status: Open - Awaiting Response or Evaluation/Approval of Response
Eliminate the atmospheric storage tank exemption from the PSM standard.
(Superseded 2001-05-I-DE-R1 from the Motiva report and 2010-02-I-PR-R4 from the Caribbean Petroleum (CAPECO) report)
2002-02-I-NY-8
Disseminate information on the requirements of the Hazard Communication Standard, 29 CFR 1910.1200, in the major languages spoken by workers in New York City with limited or no English speaking proficiency. Status: Closed - Acceptable Action
Disseminate information on the requirements of the Hazard Communication Standard, 29 CFR 1910.1200, in the major languages spoken by workers in New York City with limited or no English speaking proficiency.
2002-02-I-NY-9
Establish a complaint and referral system with the New York City Fire Department (FDNY) to provide for a coordinated enforcement effort that addresses the following issues: Policy and practice for referring to OSHA possible health and safety violations or unsafe conditions observed by FDNY personnel in the course of conducting inspections, but outside the scope of FDNY responsibility. Periodic training programs for FDNY personnel on how to recognize and refer serious workplace safety and health problems. Status: Closed - Acceptable Action
Establish a complaint and referral system with the New York City Fire Department (FDNY) to provide for a coordinated enforcement effort that addresses the following issues: Policy and practice for referring to OSHA possible health and safety violations or unsafe conditions observed by FDNY personnel in the course of conducting inspections, but outside the scope of FDNY responsibility. Periodic training programs for FDNY personnel on how to recognize and refer serious workplace safety and health problems.
2010-07-I-CT-1 URGENT!
Promulgate regulations that address fuel gas safety for both construction and general industry. At a minimum: a. Prohibit the release of flammable gas to the atmosphere for the purpose of cleaning fuel gas piping. b. Prohibit flammable gas venting or purging indoors. Prohibit venting or purging outdoors where fuel gas may form a flammable atmosphere in the vicinity of workers and/or ignition sources. c. Prohibit any work activity in areas where the concentration of flammable gas exceeds a fixed low percentage of the lower explosive limit (LEL) determined by appropriate combustible gas monitoring. d. Require that companies develop flammable gas safety procedures and training that involves contractors, workers, and their representatives in decision-making. Status: Closed - Unacceptable Action/No Response Received
Promulgate regulations that address fuel gas safety for both construction and general industry. At a minimum: a. Prohibit the release of flammable gas to the atmosphere for the purpose of cleaning fuel gas piping. b. Prohibit flammable gas venting or purging indoors. Prohibit venting or purging outdoors where fuel gas may form a flammable atmosphere in the vicinity of workers and/or ignition sources. c. Prohibit any work activity in areas where the concentration of flammable gas exceeds a fixed low percentage of the lower explosive limit (LEL) determined by appropriate combustible gas monitoring. d. Require that companies develop flammable gas safety procedures and training that involves contractors, workers, and their representatives in decision-making.
1998-06-I-NJ-8
Issue joint guidelines on good practices for handling reactive chemical process hazards. Ensure that these guidelines, at a minimum, address the following issues: The evaluation of reactive hazards and the consequences of reasonably foreseeable and worst-case deviations from normal operations. The importance of reporting and investigating deviations from normal operations. The determination of proper design for pressure relief capability, emergency cooling, process controls, alarms, and safety interlocks, as well as other good-practice design features for handling reactive substances. The appropriate use of chemical screening techniques such as differential scanning calorimetry. Status: Closed - Acceptable Action
Issue joint guidelines on good practices for handling reactive chemical process hazards. Ensure that these guidelines, at a minimum, address the following issues: The evaluation of reactive hazards and the consequences of reasonably foreseeable and worst-case deviations from normal operations. The importance of reporting and investigating deviations from normal operations. The determination of proper design for pressure relief capability, emergency cooling, process controls, alarms, and safety interlocks, as well as other good-practice design features for handling reactive substances. The appropriate use of chemical screening techniques such as differential scanning calorimetry.
1998-06-I-NJ-9
Participate in a hazard investigation of reactive chemical process safety conducted by the CSB. The objectives of the special investigation will include: Determine the frequency and severity of reactive chemical incidents. Examine how industry, OSHA, and EPA are currently addressing reactive chemical hazards. Determine the differences, if any, between large/medium/small companies with regard to reactive chemical policies, practices, in-house reactivity research, testing, and process engineering. Analyze the effectiveness of industry and OSHA use of the National Fire Protection Association Reactivity Rating system for process safety management purposes. Develop recommendations for reducing the number and severity of reactive chemical incidents. Status: Closed - Acceptable Action
Participate in a hazard investigation of reactive chemical process safety conducted by the CSB. The objectives of the special investigation will include: Determine the frequency and severity of reactive chemical incidents. Examine how industry, OSHA, and EPA are currently addressing reactive chemical hazards. Determine the differences, if any, between large/medium/small companies with regard to reactive chemical policies, practices, in-house reactivity research, testing, and process engineering. Analyze the effectiveness of industry and OSHA use of the National Fire Protection Association Reactivity Rating system for process safety management purposes. Develop recommendations for reducing the number and severity of reactive chemical incidents.