The CSB issues safety recommendations to prevent the recurrence or reduce the likelihood or consequences of similar incidents or hazards in the future. Recommendations are issued to a variety of parties, including government entities, safety organizations, trade unions, trade associations, corporations, emergency response organizations, educational institutions, and public interest groups. Recommendations are published in CSB reports and are closed only by vote of the Board. The CSB tracks all recommendations and communicates regularly with recommendations recipients to ensure that the recommended corrective actions are implemented.

For more information, see Frequently Asked Questions about CSB recommendations.


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Recommendations

Bethune Point Wastewater Plant Explosion (1 Recommendations)
Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) (1 Recommendations)
Open: 0% | Closed: 100%

Final Report Released On: March 13, 2007

2006-3-I-FL-6

Revise 29 CFR 1910.106 to specifically exclude the use of thermoplastics in above ground flammable liquid service.


Status: Closed - Reconsidered/Superseded
Closed - Reconsidered/Superseded (C - R/S) - Recipient rejects the recommendation and also supports the rejection with a rationale with which the Board concurs. This designation may apply when later facts indicate that the concerns expressed in the recommendation were actually addressed prior to the incident, or when a recommendation is superseded by a new, more appropriate recommendation.
 

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BLSR Operating Ltd. Vapor Cloud Fire (1 Recommendations)
Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) (1 Recommendations)
Open: 0% | Closed: 100%

Final Report Released On: September 17, 2003

2003-06-I-TX-13

Issue a Safety and Health Information Bulletin on the potential flammability hazard associated with bulk transportation of oilfield exploration and production (E&P) waste liquids. Summarize OSHA requirements for proper hazard classification by the shipper and for the use of material safety data sheets (MSDS). Summarize U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT) requirements for proper hazard classification and manifesting of flammable liquids, approved container design, and periodic testing. Discuss safe handling to minimize the generation of flammable vapor and to control ignition sources from vehicle-mounted equipment and facility equipment. Discuss the need for the employer to provide all worker safety information in languages or formats that are clearly understood by all affected personnel. Summarize the requirements for proper labeling of storage tanks to clearly identify the hazard of the contents to all employees and contractors working at the well site.


Status: Closed - Acceptable Action
Closed - Acceptable Action (C - AA) - The recipient has completed action on the recommendation. The action taken meets the objectives envisioned by the Board.
 

BP America (Texas City) Refinery Explosion (3 Recommendations)
Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) (3 Recommendations)
Open: 33% | Closed: 67%

Final Report Released On: March 20, 2007

2005-4-I-TX-5

1. Implement a national emphasis program for all oil refineries that focuses on: - The hazards of blowdown drums and stacks that release flammables to the atmosphere instead of to an inherently safer disposal system such as a flare. Particular attention should be paid to blowdown drums attached to collection piping systems servicing multiple relief valves; - The need for adequately sized disposal knockout drums to safely contain discharged flammable liquid based on accurate relief valve and disposal collection piping studies 2. Urge states that administer their own OSHA plan to implement comparable emphasis programs within their respective jurisdictions.


Status: Closed - Acceptable Action
Closed - Acceptable Action (C - AA) - The recipient has completed action on the recommendation. The action taken meets the objectives envisioned by the Board.
 

PDF Document Recommendation Status Change Summary

2005-4-I-TX-8

1. Strengthen the planned comprehensive enforcement of the OSHA Process Safety Management (PSM) standard. At a minimum: a. Identify those facilities at greatest risk of a catastrophic accident by using available indicators of process safety performance and information gathered by the EPA under its Risk Management Program (RMP). b. Conduct, or have conducted, comprehensive inspections, such as those under your Program Quality Verification (PQV) program at facilities identified as presenting the greatest risk. c. Establish the capacity to conduct more comprehensive PSM inspections by hiring or developing a sufficient cadre of highly trained and experienced inspectors. d. Expand the PSM training offered to inspectors at the OSHA National Training Institute.


Status: Closed - Acceptable Alternative Action
Closed - Acceptable Alternative Action (C - AAA)
 

PDF Document Recommendation Status Change Summary

2005-4-I-TX-9

2. Amend the OSHA PSM standard to require that a management of change (MOC) review be conducted for organizational changes that may impact process safety including: a. major organizational changes such as mergers, acquisitions, or reorganizations; b. personnel changes, including changes in staffing levels or staff experience; and c. policy changes such as budget cutting.


Status: Open - Unacceptable Response/No Response Received
Open - Unacceptable Response/No Response Received (O - UR) - Recipient responds by expressing disagreement with the need outlined in the recommendation. The Board believes, however, that there is enough supporting evidence to ask the recipient to reconsider.
 

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Caribbean Petroleum Refining Tank Explosion and Fire (1 Recommendations)
Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) (1 Recommendations)
Open: 0% | Closed: 100%

Final Report Released On: October 21, 2015

2010-02-I-PR-4

(Superseded by 2019-01-I-TX-R7 from the Intercontinental Terminals Company (ITC) report)
 
a) Revise the Flammable and Combustible Liquids standard (29 CFR§ 1910.106) to require installing, using, and maintaining a high-integrity automatic overfill prevention system with a means of level detection, logic/control equipment, and independent means of flow control for bulk aboveground storage tanks containing gasoline, jet fuel, other fuel mixtures or blends tocks, and other flammable liquids having an NFPA 704 flammability rating of 3 or higher, to protect against loss of containment. At a minimum, this system
shall meet the following requirements:
1. Separated physically and electronically and independent from the tank gauging system.
2. Engineered, operated, and maintained to achieve an appropriate level of safety integrity in accordance with the rrequirements of Part 1 of International Electro-technical Commission (IEC) 61511-SER ed1.0B-2004, Functional Safety - Safety Instrumented Systems for the Process Industry Sector. Such a system would employ a safety integrity level (SIL) documented in accordance with the principles in Part 3 of IEC 61511-SER ed1.0B-2004, accounting for the following factors:
i. The existence of nearby populations and sensitive environments;
ii. The nature and intensity of facility operations;
iv. The extent/ rigor of operator monitoring.
3. Proof tested in accordance with the validated arrangements and procedures with sufficient frequency to ensure the specified safety integrity level is maintained.
b) Establish hazard analysis, management of change and mechanical integrity management system elements for bulk above ground storage tanks in the revised 1910.106 standard that are similar to those in the Process Safety Management of Highly Hazardous Chemicals standard (29 CFR § 1910.119) and ensure these facilities are subject to Recognized and Generally Accepted Good Engineering Practices (RAGAGEP).

Status: Closed - Reconsidered/Superseded
Closed - Reconsidered/Superseded (C - R/S) - Recipient rejects the recommendation and also supports the rejection with a rationale with which the Board concurs. This designation may apply when later facts indicate that the concerns expressed in the recommendation were actually addressed prior to the incident, or when a recommendation is superseded by a new, more appropriate recommendation.
 

PDF Document Recommendation Status Change Summary

Combustible Dust Hazard Investigation (5 Recommendations)
Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) (5 Recommendations)
Open: 0% | Closed: 100%

Final Report Released On: November 09, 2006

2006-1-H-1

(Superseded by 2017-07-I-WI-R10 from the Didion Milling Co. investigation)

Issue a standard designed to prevent combustible dust fires and explosions in general industry. Base the standard on current National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) dust explosion standards (including NFPA 654 and NFPA 484), and include at least - hazard assessment, - engineering controls, - housekeeping, - building design, - explosion protection, - operating procedures, and - worker training.


Status: Closed - Reconsidered/Superseded
Closed - Reconsidered/Superseded (C - R/S) - Recipient rejects the recommendation and also supports the rejection with a rationale with which the Board concurs. This designation may apply when later facts indicate that the concerns expressed in the recommendation were actually addressed prior to the incident, or when a recommendation is superseded by a new, more appropriate recommendation.
 

PDF Document Recommendation Status Change Summary

2006-1-H-2

Revise the Hazard Communication Standard (HCS) (1910.1200) to: - Clarify that the HCS covers combustible dusts, including those materials that may reasonably be anticipated to generate combustible dusts through downstream processing or handling. - Require Material Safety Data Sheets (MSDSs) to include the hazards and physical properties of combustible dusts, as well as clear information on safe handling practices and references to relevant consensus standards.


Status: Closed - Acceptable Action
Closed - Acceptable Action (C - AA) - The recipient has completed action on the recommendation. The action taken meets the objectives envisioned by the Board.
 

PDF Document Recommendations Status Change Summary

2006-1-H-3

Communicate to the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE) the need to amend the Globally Harmonized System (GHS) to address combustible dust hazards by: - defining combustible dusts, - specifying the hazards that must be addressed in chemical information sheets, and - addressing the physical properties that must be included on a chemical information sheet pertinent to combustible dusts.


Status: Closed - Acceptable Action
Closed - Acceptable Action (C - AA) - The recipient has completed action on the recommendation. The action taken meets the objectives envisioned by the Board.
 

2006-1-H-4

Provide training through the OSHA Training Institute (OTI) on recognizing and preventing combustible dust explosions.


Status: Closed - Acceptable Action
Closed - Acceptable Action (C - AA) - The recipient has completed action on the recommendation. The action taken meets the objectives envisioned by the Board.
 

2006-1-H-5

While a standard is being developed, identify manufacturing industries at risk and develop and implement a national Special Emphasis Program (SEP) on combustible dust hazards in general industry. Include in the SEP an outreach program focused on the information in the Safety and Health Information Bulletin (SHIB), Combustible Dust in Industry: Preventing and Mitigating the Effects of Fire and Explosions.


Status: Closed - Acceptable Action
Closed - Acceptable Action (C - AA) - The recipient has completed action on the recommendation. The action taken meets the objectives envisioned by the Board.
 

Didion Milling Company Explosion and Fire (3 Recommendations)
Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) (3 Recommendations)
Open: 100% | Closed: 0%

Final Report Released On: December 06, 2023

2017-07-I-WI-10

Promulgate a standard for all industries that handle combustible dust, which should be based on the requirements of current NFPA combustible dust standards, including NFPA 61, Standard for the Prevention of Fires and Dust Explosions in Agricultural and Food Processing Facilities, NFPA 484, Standard for Combustible Metals, NFPA 652, Standard on the Fundamentals of Combustible Dust, NFPA 654, Standard for the Prevention of Fire and Dust Explosions from the Manufacturing, Processing, and Handling of Combustible Particulate Solids, NFPA 655, Standard for Prevention of Sulfur Fires and Explosions, NFPA 664, Standard for the Prevention of Fires and Explosions in Wood Processing and Woodworking Facilities, or a successor standard. At a minimum, the standard should include the following elements:

a. Hazard Recognition;

b. Dust Hazard Analysis;

c. Management of Change;

d. Incident Investigation;

e. Engineering Controls;

f. Building Design;

g. Fugitive Dust Management;

h. Operating Procedures;

i. Process Safety Information; 

j. External Audit Management;

k. Training;

l. Emergency Response; and

m. Personal Protective Equipment.

(Superseded the following recommendations: 2006-1-H-R1 from the Combustible Dust Hazard investigation, 2008-05-I-GA-R11 from the Imperial Sugar investigation, and 2011-04-I-TN-R1 and 2011-04-I-TN-R2 from the Hoeganaes Corporation investigation)


Status: Open - Awaiting Response or Evaluation/Approval of Response
Open - Awaiting Response or Evaluation/Approval of Response (O - ARE/AR) - The recipient has not submitted a substantive response, or the evaluation by CSB staff of a response is pending, or the Board has not yet acted on staff recommendation of status.
 

PDF Document Recommendation Status Change Summary

2017-07-I-WI-11

Following implementation of CSB Recommendation No. 2017-07-I-WI-R10, update the Grain Handling Facilities Standard to clarify grain handling facilities with combustible dust are covered by the new Combustible Dust Standard.


Status: Open - Awaiting Response or Evaluation/Approval of Response
Open - Awaiting Response or Evaluation/Approval of Response (O - ARE/AR) - The recipient has not submitted a substantive response, or the evaluation by CSB staff of a response is pending, or the Board has not yet acted on staff recommendation of status.
 

PDF Document Recommendation Status Change Summary

2017-07-I-WI-12

Develop a program to trigger follow-up inspections when hazard alert letters are issued for combustible dust hazards and there is insufficient evidence to demonstrate that those hazards have been abated.


Status: Open - Awaiting Response or Evaluation/Approval of Response
Open - Awaiting Response or Evaluation/Approval of Response (O - ARE/AR) - The recipient has not submitted a substantive response, or the evaluation by CSB staff of a response is pending, or the Board has not yet acted on staff recommendation of status.
 

PDF Document Recommendation Status Change Summary

DuPont Belle Toxic Chemical Releases (2 Recommendations)
Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) (2 Recommendations)
Open: 50% | Closed: 50%

Final Report Released On: September 20, 2011

2010-06-I-WV-1

Revise OSHA 29 CFR 1910.101, General Industry Standard for Compressed Gases, to require facilities that handle toxic and highly toxic materials in compressed gas cylinders to incorporate provisions that are at least as effective as the 2010 edition of Section 7.9, Toxic and Highly Toxic Gases, in National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) 55, Compressed Gases and Cryogenic Fluids Code, including enclosures, ventilation and treatment systems, interlocked fail-safe shutdown valves, gas detection and alarm systems, piping system components, and similarly relevant layers of protection.


Status: Closed - Reconsidered/Superseded
Closed - Reconsidered/Superseded (C - R/S) - Recipient rejects the recommendation and also supports the rejection with a rationale with which the Board concurs. This designation may apply when later facts indicate that the concerns expressed in the recommendation were actually addressed prior to the incident, or when a recommendation is superseded by a new, more appropriate recommendation.
 

PDF Document Recommendation Status Change Summary

2010-06-I-WV-2

Take sustained measures to minimize the exposure of hazards to workers handling highly toxic gases from cylinders and associated regulators, gages, hoses, and appliances. Ensure that OSHA managers, compliance officers, equivalent state OSHA plan personnel, and regulated parties conform, under the Process Safety Management Standard (29 CFR 1910.119) Recognized and Generally Accepted Good Engineering Practices (RAGAGEP) provisions, to industry practices at least as effective as the following:

  1. NFPA 55 - Compressed Gases and Cryogenic Fluids Code (2010)
  2. CGA P-1 Safe Handling of Compressed Gases in Containers (2008)
  3. CGA E-9 Standard for Flexible, PTFE-lined Pigtails for Compressed Gas Service (2010)
  4. ASME B31.3 Process Piping (2008)

 


Status: Open - Acceptable Response or Alternate Response
Open - Acceptable Response or Alternate Response (O - ARAR) - Response from recipient indicates a planned action that would satisfy the objective of the recommendation when implemented.
 

PDF Document Recommendation Status Change Summary