The CSB issues safety recommendations to prevent the recurrence or reduce the likelihood or consequences of similar incidents or hazards in the future. Recommendations are issued to a variety of parties, including government entities, safety organizations, trade unions, trade associations, corporations, emergency response organizations, educational institutions, and public interest groups. Recommendations are published in CSB reports and are closed only by vote of the Board. The CSB tracks all recommendations and communicates regularly with recommendations recipients to ensure that the recommended corrective actions are implemented. For more information, see Frequently Asked Questions about CSB recommendations.
2006-1-I-TX-6
Incorporate guidance for vehicular traffic protection and remote equipment isolation into the next revision of the Center for Chemical Process Safety?s Guidelines for Hazard Evaluation Procedures. Status: Closed - Acceptable Action
Incorporate guidance for vehicular traffic protection and remote equipment isolation into the next revision of the Center for Chemical Process Safety?s Guidelines for Hazard Evaluation Procedures.
2006-1-I-TX-1
Revise policies and procedures for process hazard analysis and pre-startup safety review to more fully evaluate vehicle impact hazards, passive fire protection, and catastrophic releases. Status: Closed - Acceptable Action
Revise policies and procedures for process hazard analysis and pre-startup safety review to more fully evaluate vehicle impact hazards, passive fire protection, and catastrophic releases.
2006-1-I-TX-2
Require flame resistant clothing for workers in units at the Point Comfort complex where there is a risk of flash fires. Status: Closed - Acceptable Action
Require flame resistant clothing for workers in units at the Point Comfort complex where there is a risk of flash fires.
2006-1-I-TX-3
Communicate the findings and recommendations of this report to all companies that contracted with either M. W. Kellogg or Kellogg, Brown, and Root (KBR) for plant designs similar to the Formosa Olefins II unit. Status: Closed - Exceeds Recommended Action
Communicate the findings and recommendations of this report to all companies that contracted with either M. W. Kellogg or Kellogg, Brown, and Root (KBR) for plant designs similar to the Formosa Olefins II unit.
2006-1-I-TX-4
Communicate the findings and recommendations of this report to your petrochemical process plant design engineers. Emphasize the importance of using current consensus safety standards when designing and constructing petrochemical process plants, including the earlier designs reused for new facilities. Status: Closed - Exceeds Recommended Action
Communicate the findings and recommendations of this report to your petrochemical process plant design engineers. Emphasize the importance of using current consensus safety standards when designing and constructing petrochemical process plants, including the earlier designs reused for new facilities.
2006-1-I-TX-5
Revise KBR petrochemical process plant design procedures to ensure they address the use of current safety standards for new designs and earlier designs reused for new facilities. Status: Closed - Acceptable Action
Revise KBR petrochemical process plant design procedures to ensure they address the use of current safety standards for new designs and earlier designs reused for new facilities.