Recent Recommendation Status Updates

Each recommendation the CSB issues is monitored by CSB staff from the time it is issued to closing. CSB staff evaluate recipient responses, and the Board votes to assign status designations to recommendations based on staff evaluation. This page highlights recommendations for which the Board has recently voted to change the status of the recommendation. For more information on how the CSB defines its recommendation statuses, please visit the Recommendations Frequently Asked Questions page.

To contact CSB Recommendations Staff please email [email protected] 

 

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Recommendations

TS USA Molten Salt Eruption (7 Recommendations)
HEF Groupe (4 Recommendations)
Open: 100% | Closed: 0%

Final Report Released On: June 03, 2025

2024-01-I-TN-4

Include physical, protective barriers as part of the standard design for liquid nitriding processes. These protective barriers shall be intended to isolate employees from molten salt releases.


Status: Open - Acceptable Response or Alternate Response
Open - Acceptable Response or Alternate Response (O - ARAR) - Response from recipient indicates a planned action that would satisfy the objective of the recommendation when implemented.
 

PDF Document Recommendation Status Change Summary

2024-01-I-TN-5

Develop a safety management system that incorporates industry guidance and includes, but is not limited to:

a. A hazard analysis program for assessing the nitriding process. The program shall incorporate industry guidance, such as the Center for Chemical Process Safety’s (CCPS) Guidelines for Risk-Based Process Safety, the National Fire Protection Association’s (NFPA) Standard for Ovens and Furnaces, and ASM International’s Handbook. The program shall apply to new and existing parts, assess parts for accumulation hazards and sealed cavities, and include non-routine tasks such as reprocessing unsatisfactory parts.

b. Written operating procedures for the nitriding process. The procedures shall be based on the information gathered from the hazard analysis program. The procedures shall incorporate industry guidance, such as the Center for Chemical Process Safety’s (CCPS) Guidelines for Risk-Based Process Safety and the CCPS’s Guidelines for Writing Effective Operating and Maintenance Procedures.

c. A training program, including written materials, for the employees involved in the nitriding process. This program shall be based on the nitriding facility’s operating procedures and other relevant information from the hazard analysis program. The program shall incorporate industry guidance, such as the Center for Chemical Process Safety’s (CCPS) Guidelines for Risk-Based Process Safety.

d. An incident investigation program. This program shall include requirements for performing causal analysis, producing written reports, and communicating findings and corrective actions throughout the entire HEF Groupe organization. The program shall incorporate industry guidance, such as the Center for Chemical Process Safety’s (CCPS) Guidelines for Risk-Based Process Safety and the CCPS’s Guidelines for Investigating Process Safety Incidents.


Status: Open - Acceptable Response or Alternate Response
Open - Acceptable Response or Alternate Response (O - ARAR) - Response from recipient indicates a planned action that would satisfy the objective of the recommendation when implemented.
 

PDF Document Recommendation Status Change Summary

2024-01-I-TN-6

Develop and implement an effective and comprehensive Knowledge Management program for sharing knowledge throughout the HEF Groupe organization. Knowledge shall include all information from audits, hazard analyses, and incident investigations, including causal analyses and corrective actions recommended and taken. This program shall incorporate industry guidance, such as the Center for Chemical Process Safety’s (CCPS) Guidelines for Process Safety Knowledge Management.


Status: Open - Acceptable Response or Alternate Response
Open - Acceptable Response or Alternate Response (O - ARAR) - Response from recipient indicates a planned action that would satisfy the objective of the recommendation when implemented.
 

PDF Document Recommendation Status Change Summary

2024-01-I-TN-7

Develop and implement a comprehensive and effective Corporate Governance program. This program shall include regular audits of subordinate facilities throughout the organization, with tracking and accountability for implementation of all recommendations and corrective actions identified in the audits. Facility adherence to the safety management system recommended above shall be evaluated during the audits. The program shall require documentation of audit findings, prompt responses to deficiencies, development of corrective actions, and implementation of the corrective actions throughout the organization. This program shall incorporate industry guidance, such as the Center for Chemical Process Safety’s (CCPS) Guidelines for Implementing Process Safety Management.


Status: Open - Acceptable Response or Alternate Response
Open - Acceptable Response or Alternate Response (O - ARAR) - Response from recipient indicates a planned action that would satisfy the objective of the recommendation when implemented.
 

PDF Document Recommendation Status Change Summary

Techniques Surfaces USA (TS USA) (3 Recommendations)
Open: 67% | Closed: 33%

Final Report Released On: June 03, 2025

2024-01-I-TN-1

Implement physical, protective barriers around the molten salt baths that isolate employees from hazardous releases at all locations that perform liquid nitriding.


Status: Open - Acceptable Response or Alternate Response
Open - Acceptable Response or Alternate Response (O - ARAR) - Response from recipient indicates a planned action that would satisfy the objective of the recommendation when implemented.
 

PDF Document Recommendation Status Change Summary

2024-01-I-TN-2

Develop a safety management system that incorporates industry guidance and includes, but is not limited to:

a. A hazard analysis program for assessing the nitriding process. The program shall incorporate industry guidance, such as the Center for Chemical Process Safety’s (CCPS) Guidelines for Risk-Based Process Safety, the National Fire Protection Association’s (NFPA) Standard for Ovens and Furnaces, and ASM International’s Handbook. The program shall apply to new and existing parts, assess parts for accumulation hazards and sealed cavities, and include non-routine tasks such as reprocessing unsatisfactory parts.

b. Written operating procedures for the nitriding process. The procedures shall be based on the information gathered from the hazard analysis program. The procedures shall incorporate industry guidance, such as the Center for Chemical Process Safety’s (CCPS) Guidelines for Risk-Based Process Safety and the CCPS’s Guidelines for Writing Effective Operating and Maintenance Procedures.

c. A training program, including written materials, for the employees involved in the nitriding process. This program shall be based on the nitriding facility’s operating procedures and other relevant information from the hazard analysis program. The program shall incorporate industry guidance, such as the Center for Chemical Process Safety’s (CCPS) Guidelines for Risk-Based Process Safety.

d. An incident investigation program. This program shall include requirements for performing causal analysis, producing written reports, and communicating findings and corrective actions throughout the entire TS USA organization. The program shall incorporate industry guidance, such as the Center for Chemical Process Safety’s (CCPS) Guidelines for Risk-Based Process Safety and the CCPS’s Guidelines for Investigating Process Safety Incidents.


Status: Open - Acceptable Response or Alternate Response
Open - Acceptable Response or Alternate Response (O - ARAR) - Response from recipient indicates a planned action that would satisfy the objective of the recommendation when implemented.
 

PDF Document Recommendation Status Change Summary

2024-01-I-TN-3

For each TS USA facility, establish a position with specific professional expertise and experience in safety management systems, such as risk-based process safety. This position shall be responsible for TS USA’s safety management system, ensuring that HEF Groupe’s safety information is incorporated at the site level, and implementing regulatory and industry safety guidance.


Status: Closed - Acceptable Action
Closed - Acceptable Action (C - AA) - The recipient has completed action on the recommendation. The action taken meets the objectives envisioned by the Board.
 

PDF Document Recommendation Status Change Summary

LyondellBasell La Porte Fatal Chemical Release (2 Recommendations)
LyondellBasell Industries (2 Recommendations)
Open: 0% | Closed: 100%

Final Report Released On: May 25, 2023

2021-05-I-TX-1

Update LyondellBasell policy documents to require that procedures are developed for properly removing actuating equipment from plug valves. Require that the procedures clearly identify which non-pressure-retaining components are safe to remove and pressure-retaining components that shall not be removed, as well as ensure LyondellBasell personnel are trained on these procedures. Ensure that hazardous energy is controlled when performing these procedures, as required by 29 C.F.R. 1910.147. Require in the policy document that risk assessments for process safety are conducted before the actuating equipment removal work is authorized. Ensure that sufficient procedures and safeguards are in place to prevent worker exposure to process fluid.


Status: Closed - Acceptable Action
Closed - Acceptable Action (C - AA) - The recipient has completed action on the recommendation. The action taken meets the objectives envisioned by the Board.
 

PDF Document Recommendation Status Change Summary

2021-05-I-TX-2

Update LyondellBasell policy documents to require that LyondellBasell competent employee(s), as defined by 29 C.F.R. 1926.32(f), verify that contractors are competent, adequately trained, and qualified to perform the required work. To make this determination and to ensure work on process equipment is conducted in a safe manner, LyondellBasell competent employees may be required to oversee the work conducted by contractors on the process equipment. In the updated policy documents, include requirements to ensure that contract employees are informed of relevant process hazards and relevant details about the process equipment and are provided with equipment-specific procedures necessary to safely conduct their work.


Status: Closed - Acceptable Alternative Action
Closed - Acceptable Alternative Action (C - AAA)
 

PDF Document Recommendation Status Change Summary

Foundation Food Group Fatal Chemical Release (1 Recommendations)
National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) (1 Recommendations)
Open: 100% | Closed: 0%

Final Report Released On: December 11, 2023

2021-03-I-GA-11

Update NFPA 55 Compressed Gases and Cryogenic Fluids Code to:

a) require the use of atmospheric monitoring with cryogenic asphyxiants in accordance with industry guidance such as is contained in CGA P-76 Hazards of Oxygen-Deficient Atmospheres and CGA P-12 Safe Handling of Cryogenic Liquids in addition to CGA P-18 Standard for Bulk Inert Gas Systems; and,

b) include guidance on the adequate safe location of manual shutoff valves and devices such as emergency push buttons used to activate remotely operated emergency isolation valves (ROEIVs). At a minimum this guidance should be harmonized with the requirements of ISO 13850 Safety of machinery – Emergency stop function – Principles for design.


Status: Open - Acceptable Response or Alternate Response
Open - Acceptable Response or Alternate Response (O - ARAR) - Response from recipient indicates a planned action that would satisfy the objective of the recommendation when implemented.
 

PDF Document Recommendation Status Change Summary

Bio-Lab Lake Charles Chemical Fire and Release (1 Recommendations)
Bio-Lab Lake Charles (1 Recommendations)
Open: 100% | Closed: 0%

Final Report Released On: April 24, 2023

2020-05-I-LA-3

Perform process hazard analyses (PHAs) on all buildings and units processing or storing trichloroisocyanuric acid. Ensure that the PHAs are revalidated at least every five years. Also include the building design basis as process safety information for the PHA team to reference during their analysis.


Status: Open - Acceptable Response or Alternate Response
Open - Acceptable Response or Alternate Response (O - ARAR) - Response from recipient indicates a planned action that would satisfy the objective of the recommendation when implemented.
 

PDF Document Recommendation Status Change Summary

Aghorn Operating Inc. Waterflood Station Hydrogen Sulfide Release (1 Recommendations)
Aghorn Operating Inc. (1 Recommendations)
Open: 0% | Closed: 100%

Final Report Released On: May 21, 2021

2020-01-I-TX-7

For all waterflood stations where the potential exists to expose non-employees to H2S concentrations at or above 10 ppm, develop and implement a formal, written, site-specific security program to prevent unknown and unplanned entrance of those not employed by Aghorn, starting with a requirement for employees to lock access gates upon entering and departing the facility.


Status: Closed - Acceptable Action
Closed - Acceptable Action (C - AA) - The recipient has completed action on the recommendation. The action taken meets the objectives envisioned by the Board.
 

PDF Document Recommendation Status Change Summary

Cuisine Solutions Ammonia Release (6 Recommendations)
Cuisine Solutions Inc. Sterling Site (4 Recommendations)
Open: 100% | Closed: 0%

Final Report Released On: September 25, 2025

2024-03-I-VA-3

Reduce the likelihood or mitigate the consequences of liquid or two-phase atmospheric discharges from the ammonia refrigeration emergency pressure relief system at the Sterling plant. At a minimum:

a. Identify liquid or two-phase release scenarios, particularly for horizontal surge drums and other vessels containing saturated liquid with little vapor space;

b. Implement engineering controls to reduce the likelihood of high liquid level, overfill, or boiling overpressure scenarios;

c. Implement engineering controls to mitigate the consequences of these scenarios where their likelihood cannot be acceptably reduced, such as through emergency pressure control systems, atmospheric knockout drums, or automatic shutdown systems; and

d. Contract a competent third party to audit the pressure relief systems. The audit should ensure that (i) all relevant relief scenarios have been identified, (ii) preventive and mitigative engineering controls adequately address the hazards, and (iii) engineering controls are maintained in such a way that they function properly when required.


Status: Open - Awaiting Response or Evaluation/Approval of Response
Open - Awaiting Response or Evaluation/Approval of Response (O - ARE/AR) - The recipient has not submitted a substantive response, or the evaluation by CSB staff of a response is pending, or the Board has not yet acted on staff recommendation of status.
 

PDF Document Recommendation Status Change Summary

2024-03-I-VA-4

Implement an electronic process data historian and management system to ensure that critical process parameters are collected, tracked, and stored. The system should be available to refrigeration technicians so that they can monitor the refrigeration system and respond to and investigate process upsets.


Status: Open - Awaiting Response or Evaluation/Approval of Response
Open - Awaiting Response or Evaluation/Approval of Response (O - ARE/AR) - The recipient has not submitted a substantive response, or the evaluation by CSB staff of a response is pending, or the Board has not yet acted on staff recommendation of status.
 

PDF Document Recommendation Status Change Summary

2024-03-I-VA-5

Update the Cuisine Solutions Sterling site’s Emergency Action Plan using guidance such as the IIAR’s Critical Task Guidance for Ammonia Refrigeration System Emergency Planning. At a minimum, the updated plan should:

a. Address indoor and outdoor ammonia releases separately, including the distinct alarms and responses to them;

b. Clearly specify appropriate evacuation routes and muster points, including alternates;

c. Provide guidance for using windsocks to remain upwind of a release during evacuation;

d. Implement shelter-in-place strategies, emergency protective equipment, and emergency shutdowns, as appropriate; and

e. Include requirements to conduct annual ammonia release drills that include all onsite personnel (including corporate employees). The annual drills should include separate indoor and outdoor ammonia release scenarios and address the use of windsocks to assist with determining evacuation routes, alternate evacuation routes, muster points, and consideration for the decision to shelter-in-place. Additionally, the drills should exercise each evacuation alarm, emergency protective equipment, and emergency shutdowns, where appropriate.


Status: Open - Awaiting Response or Evaluation/Approval of Response
Open - Awaiting Response or Evaluation/Approval of Response (O - ARE/AR) - The recipient has not submitted a substantive response, or the evaluation by CSB staff of a response is pending, or the Board has not yet acted on staff recommendation of status.
 

PDF Document Recommendation Status Change Summary

2024-03-I-VA-6

Add an alarm or alarms specific to ammonia releases, so that workers can properly respond to a release. The alarm response should be documented in the updated Emergency Action Plan, and may include multiple distinct alarms and responses, such as one for shelter-in-place and one for evacuation.


Status: Open - Awaiting Response or Evaluation/Approval of Response
Open - Awaiting Response or Evaluation/Approval of Response (O - ARE/AR) - The recipient has not submitted a substantive response, or the evaluation by CSB staff of a response is pending, or the Board has not yet acted on staff recommendation of status.
 

PDF Document Recommendation Status Change Summary

International Institute of All-Natural Refrigeration (IIAR) (2 Recommendations)
Open: 100% | Closed: 0%

Final Report Released On: September 25, 2025

2024-03-I-VA-1

Update ANSI/IIAR 2 to include guidance for preventing or mitigating liquid or two-phase atmospheric discharges from emergency pressure relief systems, such as the guidance in API Standard 521, Pressure-relieving and Depressuring Systems. At a minimum, the guidance should:

a. Identify at-risk scenarios such as horizontal surge vessels and other vessels containing saturated liquid with little vapor space;

b. Address design considerations and controls to reduce the likelihood of identified scenarios leading to overpressure or equipment failure and ensure vapor-liquid disengagement (the separation of vapor from liquid) during pressure relief for identified scenarios; and

c. Require mitigative safeguards in cases where vapor-liquid disengagement during pressure relief cannot be reliably ensured. This should also include alternative disposal systems where applicable.


Status: Open - Awaiting Response or Evaluation/Approval of Response
Open - Awaiting Response or Evaluation/Approval of Response (O - ARE/AR) - The recipient has not submitted a substantive response, or the evaluation by CSB staff of a response is pending, or the Board has not yet acted on staff recommendation of status.
 

PDF Document Recommendation Status Change Summary

2024-03-I-VA-2

Update ANSI/IIAR 2 to include a requirement to assess whether emergency pressure relief devices discharge to a safe location, such as with a dispersion analysis.


Status: Open - Awaiting Response or Evaluation/Approval of Response
Open - Awaiting Response or Evaluation/Approval of Response (O - ARE/AR) - The recipient has not submitted a substantive response, or the evaluation by CSB staff of a response is pending, or the Board has not yet acted on staff recommendation of status.
 

PDF Document Recommendation Status Change Summary

Yenkin-Majestic Resin Plant Vapor Cloud Explosion and Fire (2 Recommendations)
Yenkin-Majestic/OPC Polymers (2 Recommendations)
Open: 100% | Closed: 0%

Final Report Released On: November 30, 2023

2021-04-I-OH-4

Identify and document all equipment that could release flammable materials and install LEL detectors in accordance with sources and guidance such as Guidelines for Engineering Design for Process Safety by the Center for Chemical Process Safety and Explosion Hazards in the Process Industries by Rolf K. Eckhoff. Ensure that detection of hazardous conditions automatically triggers both visual and audible alarms to alert plant personnel of the hazard. Develop and implement employee training on actions to take, such as prompt evacuation, when such alarms are activated.


Status: Open - Unacceptable Response/No Response Received
Open - Unacceptable Response/No Response Received (O - UR) - Recipient responds by expressing disagreement with the need outlined in the recommendation. The Board believes, however, that there is enough supporting evidence to ask the recipient to reconsider.
 

PDF Document Recommendation Status Change Summary

2021-04-I-OH-5

Develop and implement requirements for personnel to wear flame-resistant uniforms in all operating areas that process flammable chemicals. Update employee training material to include the requirement for and purpose of PPE use.


Status: Open - Unacceptable Response/No Response Received
Open - Unacceptable Response/No Response Received (O - UR) - Recipient responds by expressing disagreement with the need outlined in the recommendation. The Board believes, however, that there is enough supporting evidence to ask the recipient to reconsider.
 

PDF Document Recommendation Status Change Summary