Accident: Morton International Inc. Runaway Chemical Reaction
Location: Location: Patterson, NJ
Accident Occurred On: 04/08/1998 | Final Report Released On: 08/16/2000
Accident Type: Reactive Incident
Investigation Status: The final report on this investigation was approved August 16, 2000.
On April 8, 1998, an explosion and fire occurred during the production of Automate Yellow 96 Dye at the Morton International Inc. plant in Paterson, New Jersey. The explosion and fire were the consequence of a runaway reaction, which overpressurized a 2000-gallon chemical vessel and released flammable material that ignited. Nine employees were injured.
Communicate the findings of this report to your membership.
Issue joint guidelines on good practices for handling reactive chemical process hazards. Ensure that these guidelines, at a minimum, address the following issues: The evaluation of reactive hazards and the consequences of reasonably foreseeable and worst-case deviations from normal operations. The importance of reporting and investigating deviations from normal operations. The determination of proper design for pressure relief capability, emergency cooling process controls, alarms, and safety interlocks, as well as other good-practice design features for handling reactive substances. The appropriate use of chemical screening techniques such as differential scanning calorimetry.
Participate in a hazard investigation of reactive chemical process safety conducted by the CSB. The objectives of the special investigation will include: Determine the frequency and severity of reactive chemical incidents. Examine how industry, OSHA, and EPA are currently addressing reactive chemical hazards. Determine the differences, if any, between large/medium/small companies with regard to reactive chemical policies, practices, in-house reactivity research, testing, and process engineering. Analyze the effectiveness of industry and OSHA use of the National Fire Protection Association Reactivity Rating system for process safety management purposes. Develop recommendations for reducing the number and severity of reactive chemical incidents.
Revalidate Process Hazard Analyses for all reactive chemical processes in light of the findings of the U.S. Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board (CSB) report and upgrade, as needed, equipment, operating procedures, and training.
Evaluate pressure relief requirements for all reaction vessels using appropriate technology, such as the Design Institute for Emergency Relief Systems (DIERS)50 method and test apparatus and upgrade equipment as needed.
Evaluate the need for and install, as necessary, devices, such as alarms, added safety instrumentation, and quench or reactor dump systems to safely manage reactive chemical process hazards.
Revise operating procedures and training for reactive chemical processes as needed, to include descriptions of the possible consequences of deviations from normal operational limits and steps that should be taken to correct these deviations, including emergency response actions.
Implement a program to ensure that deviations from normal operational limits for reactive chemical processes that could have resulted in significant incidents are documented and investigated and necessary safety improvements are implemented.
Revise the Yellow 96 Material Safety Data Sheet (MSDS) to show the proper boiling point and National Fire Protection Association reactivity rating. Evaluate the need for and change, as necessary, the MSDSs for other Morton dyes. Communicate the MSDS changes to current and past customers (who may retain inventories of these products).
Establish a program that ensures that reactive chemical process safety information and operating experience are collected and shared with all relevant units of the company.
Issue joint guidelines on good practices for handling reactive chemical process hazards. Ensure that these guidelines, at a minimum, address the following issues: The evaluation of reactive hazards and the consequences of reasonably foreseeable and worst-case deviations from normal operations. The importance of reporting and investigating deviations from normal operations. The determination of proper design for pressure relief capability, emergency cooling, process controls, alarms, and safety interlocks, as well as other good-practice design features for handling reactive substances. The appropriate use of chemical screening techniques such as differential scanning calorimetry.