



U.S. Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board

OFFICE OF GENERAL COUNSEL

Memorandum

To: Board Members

From: Christopher M. Lyon  
Acting General Counsel *Christopher M. Lyon*

Cc: Amanda Johnson  
Adam Henson  
Leadership Team

Subject: Board Action Report – Notation Item 2025-2

Date: October 23, 2024

On October 23, 2024, the Board approved Notation Item 2025-2, thereby designating Recommendation 2010-02-I-PR-R3, to the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), from the Caribbean Petroleum Refining Tank Explosion and Fire investigation (2010-02-I-PR), with the status of Closed – Acceptable Action.

**Voting Summary – Notation Item 2025-2**

**Disposition: APPROVED**

**Disposition date: October 23, 2024**

	Approve	Disapprove	Calendar	Not Participating	Date
S. Johnson	X				10/21/2024
S. Owens	X				10/23/2024
C. Sandoval	X				10/21/2024



## U. S. Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board RECOMMENDATION STATUS CHANGE SUMMARY

<b>Report:</b>	Caribbean Petroleum Refining Tank Explosion and Fire
<b>Recommendation Number:</b>	2010-02-I-PR-R3
<b>Date Issued:</b>	October 21, 2015
<b>Recipient:</b>	Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)
<b>New Status:</b>	Closed – Acceptable Action
<b>Date of Status Change:</b>	October 23, 2024

### Recommendation Text:

*As an interim measure, until the rule changes in CSB Recommendation No. 2010-02-I-PR-R1 are adopted and go into effect: issue appropriate guidance or an alert, similar to EPA's previously issued Chemical Safety Alert addressing Rupture Hazard from Liquid Storage Tanks, to illustrate the hazards posed by spills, releases, fires and explosions due to overfilling bulk aboveground storage containers storing gasoline, jet fuel, blendstocks, and other flammable liquids having an NFPA 704 flammability rating of 3 or higher.*

### Board Status Change Decision:

#### A. Rationale for Recommendation

On October 23, 2009, an above ground storage tank at the Caribbean Petroleum Corporation (CAPECO) tank farm facility in Bayamón, Puerto Rico was overfilled. The overfill occurred during the offloading of the tank ship, Cape Bruny. An estimated 200,000 gallons of gasoline was spilled during the overfill.

During the overflow some of the gasoline, which sprayed from the tank's roof vents and hit the tank's wind girder as it fell, aerosolized forming a large vapor cloud (estimated to encompass an area of about 107 acres) that subsequently ignited after reaching an ignition source in CAPECO's wastewater treatment facility. The ensuing blast, multiple secondary explosions and fire resulted in significant damage to 17 of 48 petroleum storage tanks. The blast created a pressure wave that registered 2.9 on the Richter scale and damaged approximately 300 homes and businesses, up to 1.25 miles from the site. Fortunately, there were no fatalities and only three people experienced minor injuries offsite as a result of the initial blast. The fires burned for almost 60 hours. Petroleum products leaked into the soil, nearby wetlands, and navigable waterways in the surrounding area.

As a part of its investigation, the U.S. Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board (CSB) analyzed relevant regulatory, industry, and consensus standards for safety and management of bulk aboveground storage facilities. While certain environmental statutes and EPA regulations apply to bulk aboveground storage tank terminals, such as CAPECO, the CSB determined that these regulations do not offer robust protections to the public from catastrophic explosion and fire incidents that may occur due to overfilling at such facilities that store gasoline, jet fuels,

blendstocks, and other flammable liquids having an NFPA 704 flammability rating of 3 or higher. As a result of this finding, the CSB issued three recommendations to the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). This status change summary addresses CSB Recommendation No. 2010-02-I-PR-R3.

B. Response to the Recommendation

The EPA notified the CSB that *Technical Alert: Failures of Overfill Prevention at Substantial Harm Oil Facilities*<sup>1</sup> has been developed and is available publicly on the EPA's website. This technical alert discusses the Caribbean Petroleum Refining Tank Explosion and Fire, as well as several other similar incidents, and the responsibility of owner/operators to maintain and inspect equipment and/or implement procedures to prevent overfills. The CSB has reviewed the technical alert and determined that it meets the requirements of the recommendation.

C. Board Analysis and Decision

Based upon the information above, the Board voted to change CSB Recommendation No. 2010-02-I-PR-R3 to: "Closed – Acceptable Action."

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<sup>1</sup> See <https://www.epa.gov/oil-spills-prevention-and-preparedness-regulations/technical-alert-failures-overfill-prevention> (Accessed October 7, 2024).